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Abstract:	  My	  thesis	  topic	  is	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  effects	  that	  a	  congestion	  tax	  in	  mid-­‐town	  Manhattan	  would	  have	  on	  drivers	  who	  normally	  drive	  there.	  A	  congestion	  charge	  was	  proposed	  in	  2008	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  lessen	  traffic	  in	  Manhattan	  below	  80th	  street,	  but	  it	  was	  struck	  down	  in	  the	  New	  York	  State	  Assembly.	  My	  thesis	  will	  look	  into	  the	  data	  the	  Assembly	  used	  to	  make	  its	  decision	  to	  reject	  the	  charge.	  I	  will	  then	  use	  this	  and	  other	  data	  to	  calculate	  my	  own	  elasticity	  and	  find	  hypothetical	  effects	  of	  a	  congestion	  tax	  in	  the	  area	  on	  drivers.	  Then	  I	  will	  formulate	  my	  own	  proposal	  on	  whether	  the	  charge	  would	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  progressive	  or	  regressive	  tax.	  
Congestion	  Charge:	  	  “Congestion	  pricing	  is	  a	  way	  to	  harness	  the	  power	  of	  the	  market	  to	  reduce	  the	  waste	  associated	  with	  traffic	  congestion”	  (USFHA,	  Pg.	  1).	  The	  use	  of	  untolled	  roads	  creates	  several	  negative	  externalities,	  a	  cost	  that	  affects	  a	  party	  who	  did	  not	  choose	  to	  incur	  that	  cost.	  The	  two	  major	  externalities	  of	  untolled	  roads	  are	  congestion	  and	  environmental	  consequences	  such	  as	  pollution	  from	  vehicles.	  A	  congestion	  charge	  is	  implemented	  to	  account	  for	  these	  negative	  externalities	  on	  society.	  Graph	  1(Deelen)	  shows	  the	  effects	  of	  externalities.	  The	  x-­‐axis,	  or	  q	  is	  the	  quantity	  of	  driving	  demanded	  while	  the	  y-­‐axis	  is	  the	  cost	  of	  driving.	  The	  individual	  cost	  curve	  is	  the	  only	  cost	  that	  drivers	  are	  taking	  into	  account	  when	  they	  choose	  to	  drive.	  These	  costs	  are	  gas	  prices,	  vehicle	  registrations,	  car	  upkeep	  and	  other	  factors.	  However,	  the	  individual	  costs	  do	  not	  factor	  in	  the	  negative	  externality.	  This	  means	  that	  the	  unit	  cost	  for	  driving	  is	  too	  low	  and	  people	  are	  not	  at	  the	  social	  equilibrium,	  which	  is	  point	  G.	  They	  are	  at	  the	  private	  equilibrium,	  which	  is	  point	  F.	  	  Drivers	  will	  not	  adjust	  their	  demand	  for	  driving	  to	  the	  social	  equilibrium	  unless	  they	  are	  forced	  to	  pay	  for	  the	  negative	  externality.	  This	  is	  why	  a	  congestion	  charge	  is	  implemented,	  to	  make	  the	  individual	  cost	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curve	  equal	  to	  the	  social	  cost	  curve.	  	  The	  amount	  of	  the	  congestion	  charge	  is	  GI,	  because	  this	  is	  the	  cost	  of	  the	  negative	  externality	  to	  society	  at	  the	  optimum	  level.	  Correctly	  pricing	  the	  externality	  is	  difficult	  for	  a	  government	  or	  agency	  trying	  to	  get	  the	  public	  to	  use	  a	  good	  at	  the	  socially	  optimum	  level.	  	  Graph1:	  Graphical	  representation	  of	  Negative	  Externalities	  
	  Source:	  Deelen	  
New	  York	  City	  Congestion	  Tax:	  The	  idea	  of	  enacting	  a	  congestion	  tax	  in	  New	  York	  City	  began	  in	  2003.	  A	  report	  was	  presented	  at	  the	  Eno	  Transportation	  Foundation	  conference.	  Four	  scenarios	  were	  put	  forth	  in	  the	  paper	  to	  help	  control	  the	  rising	  congestion	  on	  NYC	  roads	  and	  help	  raise	  revenues	  for	  the	  city.	  One	  of	  the	  scenarios,	  which	  was	  eventually	  proposed,	  was	  modeled	  after	  London’s	  congestion	  tax,	  which	  is	  a	  5-­‐pound	  ($8),	  flat	  rate	  tax	  to	  enter	  a	  certain	  zone	  of	  the	  city	  between	  certain	  times	  (Zupan	  Pg.	  21,	  2003).	  However,	  Mayor	  Bloomberg	  did	  not	  officially	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propose	  this	  congestion	  tax	  in	  NYC	  until	  2007.	  The	  tax	  was	  part	  of	  his	  larger	  PlayNYC	  2030	  plan,	  which	  was	  a	  proposal	  for	  different	  economic,	  social,	  and	  environmental	  initiatives	  that	  would	  help	  improve	  the	  infrastructure	  and	  land	  use	  of	  the	  city	  (Schaller,	  2010).	  The	  congestion	  charge	  was	  going	  to	  be	  implemented	  from	  6	  a.m.	  to	  6	  p.m.	  on	  weekdays	  in	  a	  zone	  from	  86th	  street	  to	  Battery	  Park	  (Appendix	  1,	  Schaller	  2010).	  It	  would	  be	  $8	  dollars	  for	  automobiles	  coming	  into	  the	  zone,	  and	  $4	  dollars	  for	  those	  originating	  in	  the	  zone.	  Small	  trucks	  would	  be	  charged	  $21	  dollars	  and	  large	  trucks	  $42	  dollars,	  and	  the	  fee	  would	  be	  halved	  if	  they	  originated	  in	  the	  zone.	  In	  addition,	  there	  would	  be	  a	  deduction	  in	  the	  charge	  if	  the	  vehicle	  entered	  the	  zone	  over	  a	  tolled	  roadway	  (Schaller	  Pg.	  5	  2010).	  This	  means	  if	  drivers	  came	  into	  the	  tolled	  zone	  through	  the	  Holland	  Tunnel,	  which	  has	  a	  toll	  of	  over	  $8	  dollars,	  they	  would	  not	  be	  required	  to	  pay	  the	  congestion	  charge.	  If	  the	  toll	  is	  less	  than	  $8	  dollars	  the	  drivers	  are	  required	  to	  pay	  the	  difference.	  The	  plan	  to	  enforce	  the	  toll	  was	  similar	  to	  London’s	  as	  well,	  with	  cameras	  throughout	  the	  zone	  that	  capture	  either	  a	  tag	  or	  license	  plate.	  The	  revenue	  from	  the	  congestion	  charge	  was	  projected	  to	  about	  $700	  million	  dollars	  a	  year	  (Zupan	  Pg.	  35,	  2003).	  However,	  the	  congestion	  tax	  was	  never	  implemented	  because	  it	  failed,	  to	  pass	  in	  the	  NYS	  Assembly.	  There	  were	  several	  factors	  why	  it	  failed	  outlined	  in	  “An	  Inquiry	  into	  Congestion	  Pricing	  as	  Proposed	  in	  PlayNYC	  2030”	  written	  by	  Assemblyman	  Brodsky.	  Some	  of	  the	  factors	  include	  privacy	  concerns,	  the	  infrastructure	  cost,	  and	  the	  view	  that	  a	  congestion	  tax	  is	  a	  regressive	  tax.	  	  	   This	  paper	  focuses	  on	  the	  assessment	  that	  the	  congestion	  tax	  would	  be	  a	  regressive	  tax	  and	  the	  ramifications	  of	  allowing	  toll	  offsets	  for	  those	  who	  drive	  over	  tolled	  roadways	  before	  entering	  the	  congestion	  zone.	  The	  appendix	  for	  Assemblyman	  Brodsky’s	  report	  contained	  an	  analysis	  of	  information	  about	  drivers	  entering	  into	  New	  York	  City	  (Appendix	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2,	  Brodsky,	  2007).	  These	  charts	  show	  information	  such	  as	  commuter	  trips	  and	  average	  income	  of	  commuters	  by	  region,	  average	  daily	  trips	  from	  different	  regions,	  and	  the	  effects	  congestion	  pricing	  would	  have	  on	  drivers	  from	  different	  zones.	  The	  paper	  gives	  no	  indication	  of	  how	  they	  formulate	  the	  percentage	  changes	  in	  drivers	  under	  the	  congestion	  tax.	  	  Therefore	  one	  must	  be	  skeptical	  of	  the	  elasticity	  used	  in	  this	  paper	  to	  compute	  the	  change	  in	  drivers	  from	  each	  region	  and	  income	  bracket.	  My	  goal	  is	  to	  compute	  my	  own	  elasticity	  and	  compare	  my	  results	  to	  his	  results.	  I	  expect	  that	  my	  results	  may	  differ	  because	  this	  report	  was	  created	  to	  ensure	  the	  bill	  was	  not	  passed,	  so	  they	  may	  have	  overstated	  the	  effects	  to	  achieve	  the	  results	  desired.	  	  
Literature	  Review:	  New	  York	  City’s	  Independent	  Budget	  Office	  released	  the	  Fiscal	  Brief,	  “Bridge	  Tolls:	  Who	  Would	  Pay?	  And	  How	  Much?”	  in	  October	  2003.	  It	  considered	  the	  implications	  of	  charging	  a	  toll	  on	  the	  free	  East	  River	  and	  Harlem	  River	  bridges.	  The	  idea	  of	  raising	  a	  toll	  was	  sparked	  by	  the	  rising	  congestion	  within	  NYC	  and	  the	  need	  to	  increase	  revenue.	  This	  tax	  would	  provide	  a	  solution	  to	  both	  of	  these	  problems.	  The	  projected	  decrease	  in	  traffic	  over	  the	  bridges	  was	  19%	  for	  East	  River	  Bridges	  and	  13%	  for	  the	  Harlem	  River	  bridges.	  In	  addition,	  the	  revenue	  from	  the	  tolls	  was	  expected	  to	  be	  around	  $693	  million	  (IBO	  Pg.	  3,	  2003).	  This	  report	  is	  important	  to	  my	  topic	  because	  it	  puts	  forth	  an	  idea	  that	  is	  very	  similar	  to	  a	  congestion	  tax	  in	  lower	  Manhattan.	  If	  these	  free	  bridges	  were	  tolled,	  then	  no	  driver	  could	  enter	  Manhattan	  without	  paying	  a	  fee.	  This	  study	  targets	  the	  areas	  and	  roadways	  I	  am	  concerned	  with	  because	  I	  believe	  the	  congestion	  tax	  will	  largely	  affect	  people	  driving	  over	  these	  bridges.	  Since	  all	  other	  entry	  points	  into	  the	  congestion	  zone	  are	  tolled,	  the	  offset	  makes	  the	  charge	  nonexistent	  for	  those	  drivers.	  The	  report	  did	  not	  indicate	  how	  the	  percentage	  change	  in	  traffic	  volume	  was	  calculated,	  but	  I	  will	  compare	  my	  results	  with	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theirs.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  IBO’s	  percent	  change	  in	  traffic,	  19%,	  is	  more	  than	  the	  estimated	  percentage	  change	  in	  traffic	  that	  the	  “An	  Inquiry	  into	  Congestion	  Pricing	  as	  Proposed	  in	  PlayNYC	  2030”,	  16%,	  for	  the	  East	  River	  bridge.	  	  	   The	  IBO	  report	  is	  a	  great	  stepping-­‐stone	  to	  help	  me	  analyze	  the	  affects	  of	  a	  congestion	  charge	  with	  the	  elasticity	  I	  calculate	  because	  the	  paper	  also	  focuses	  on	  which	  income	  groups	  will	  be	  most	  affected	  by	  the	  proposed	  bridge	  toll.	  The	  Fiscal	  Brief	  used	  the	  Regional	  Travel-­‐Household	  Interview	  Survey,	  which	  was	  conducted	  from	  May	  1997	  to	  May	  1998,	  for	  its	  data	  set.	  The	  Survey	  data	  were	  of	  the	  driving	  habits	  of	  metropolitan	  households.	  From	  this	  they	  were	  able	  to	  determine	  the	  percentage	  of	  people	  who	  were	  driving	  over	  the	  free	  bridges,	  their	  demographics,	  incomes	  and	  if	  they	  were	  NYC	  residents	  (Appendix	  3).	  Rather	  than	  rerunning	  the	  model	  to	  check	  their	  results	  from	  the	  Regional	  Travel-­‐Household	  Survey,	  I	  will	  accept	  their	  results.	  	   Two	  interesting	  findings	  from	  the	  paper	  are	  that	  “most	  of	  the	  drivers	  who	  use	  the	  free	  crossings	  reside	  in	  New	  York”	  and	  that	  “City	  residents	  who	  drive	  across	  the	  free	  bridges	  are	  more	  affluent	  than	  city	  residents	  who	  enter	  Manhattan	  via	  transit”	  (IBO,	  Pg.1	  2003).	  This	  information	  implies	  that	  the	  congestion	  charge	  will	  not	  be	  a	  regressive	  tax	  and	  that	  it	  will	  affect	  NYC	  residents	  more.	  The	  Brief	  does	  not	  specifically	  compute	  the	  exact	  changes	  in	  each	  income	  bracket’s	  driving	  tendency	  resulting	  from	  the	  charge.	  Rather,	  they	  extrapolated	  a	  diversion	  factor	  from	  a	  DOT	  paper	  in	  1991.	  The	  diversion	  factor	  is	  the	  percentage	  of	  people	  who	  will	  now	  find	  alternate	  routes	  to	  commute	  into	  the	  city.	  This	  could	  be	  by	  public	  transportation	  or	  another	  tolled	  entry.	  Although	  their	  diversion	  factor	  is	  higher	  than	  the	  Inquiry’s,	  one	  must	  be	  skeptical	  of	  it	  because	  the	  DOT	  report	  does	  not	  state	  how	  they	  determined	  these	  figures.	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The	  Triborough	  Bridge	  and	  Tunnel	  Authority	  Investor	  Solutions	  Report	  is	  an	  excellent	  resource	  for	  historic	  information	  about	  the	  bridges	  and	  tunnels	  the	  TBTA	  runs.	  They	  have	  access	  to	  data	  not	  only	  on	  the	  traffic	  volumes	  but	  also	  on	  population	  and	  employment	  trends.	  The	  two	  important	  pieces	  of	  data	  in	  the	  report	  are	  the	  toll	  price	  history	  of	  the	  nine	  bridges	  and	  tunnels	  they	  control	  and	  the	  elasticity	  they	  compute	  for	  each	  of	  these	  nine	  bridges	  and	  tunnels.	  Table	  1	  below	  has	  the	  historic	  elasticity	  factor	  for	  toll	  prices	  (TBTA	  Pg.	  33,	  2011).	  These	  elasticities	  are	  important	  for	  policy	  makers	  because	  they	  demonstrate	  the	  effect	  that	  increasing	  tolls	  will	  have	  on	  the	  traffic	  on	  these	  bridges.	  The	  figures	  can	  also	  be	  used	  to	  analyze	  the	  effects	  of	  tolling	  untolled	  bridges.	  A	  quick	  glance	  at	  the	  data	  shows	  how	  important	  the	  toll	  price	  is	  to	  drivers	  who	  use	  the	  free	  bridges.	  The	  Carey	  Tunnel	  (Battery	  Tunnel)	  elasticity	  demonstrates	  this	  because	  the	  Carey	  Tunnel	  is	  tolled	  and	  is	  right	  near	  both	  the	  Brooklyn	  and	  Manhattan	  bridges,	  which	  are	  free.	  This	  suggests	  that	  when	  drivers	  have	  free	  options	  the	  elasticity	  factor	  is	  higher	  than	  when	  they	  do	  not	  have	  free	  alternatives.	  It	  would	  be	  interesting	  to	  see	  the	  elasticity	  for	  the	  tunnel	  if	  the	  bridges	  around	  it	  were	  also	  tolled.	  The	  practical	  application	  of	  these	  factors	  to	  my	  research	  is	  that	  I	  hope	  to	  run	  regressions	  on	  all	  of	  these	  toll	  facilities	  and	  compare	  my	  results	  to	  theirs.	  By	  doing	  this	  I	  can	  possibly	  validate	  their	  models	  if	  the	  figures	  are	  close,	  or	  point	  out	  discrepancies	  if	  the	  figures	  are	  drastically	  different.	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Throgs Neck Bridge -0.109 
Bronx-Whitestone 
Bridge -0.109 
RFK Bridge 0.164 
Queens Midtown Tunnel -0.192 
Hugh L. Carey Tunnel -0.358 
Henry Hudson Bridge -0.282 
Marine Parkway Bridge -0.101 
Cross Bay Bridge -0.137 
Source: Santec/TBTA Pg. 33 
Notes:  
(a) For each 1% increase in toll the volume is expected to 
decrease by the elasticity factor; e.g. for each 1% increase in 
the cash toll at the Queens Midtown Tunnel, cash traffic would 
decrease by 0.240% 
(b) Based on the distribution of traffic by payment type and 
facility.  	  	  Jonathan	  Peters	  and	  Jonathan	  Kramer	  wrote	  an	  interesting	  paper	  about	  the	  vertical	  equity	  of	  the	  proposed	  congestion	  tax.	  They	  broke	  down	  the	  “winners”	  and	  “losers”	  from	  the	  tax.	  The	  winners	  are:	  drivers	  whose	  time	  saved	  is	  worth	  more	  than	  the	  new	  toll	  and	  the	  public	  transit	  users	  who	  will	  benefit	  from	  the	  improved	  facilities.	  The	  losers	  are:	  drivers	  whose	  time	  saved	  is	  worth	  less	  than	  the	  tax,	  drivers	  who	  switch	  to	  less	  convenient	  routes,	  and	  people	  whose	  roadways	  are	  more	  congested	  as	  drivers	  seek	  alternate	  routes	  (Peters	  and	  Kramer	  Pg.	  124,	  2012).	  They	  determined	  that	  those	  who	  drive	  over	  the	  Harlem	  River	  and	  East	  River	  Bridges	  would	  have	  a	  higher	  hourly	  cost	  compared	  to	  all	  other	  routes	  into	  Manhattan	  because	  of	  the	  toll	  offset	  program	  (Peters	  and	  Kramer	  Pg.	  125,	  2012).	  This	  issue	  of	  the	  congestion	  charge	  only	  effecting	  one	  area,	  drivers	  from	  the	  east	  and	  north,	  from	  the	  boroughs	  of	  Queens,	  Brooklyn,	  and	  the	  Bronx,	  arises	  in	  this	  paper	  again.	  This	  paper	  does	  not	  determine	  the	  change	  in	  traffic	  amounts	  on	  the	  different	  bridges	  and	  tunnels,	  rather	  it	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goes	  for	  a	  more	  general	  approach	  by	  using	  the	  Lorenz	  curve	  and	  Gini	  coefficients	  of	  selected	  areas	  to	  see	  which	  area	  will	  pay	  for	  the	  tax.	  Their	  results	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  population	  that	  drives	  over	  the	  free	  toll	  bridges	  would	  be	  considered	  middle	  class	  with	  average	  income	  ranging	  from	  $56k	  to	  $81k	  (Peters	  Pg.131	  2012).	  They	  also	  found	  the	  median	  income	  for	  users	  of	  both	  tolled	  and	  untolled	  bridges	  (Appendix	  4).	  They	  concluded	  that	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  congestion	  tax	  would	  come	  from	  the	  middle	  class.	  Their	  work	  is	  important	  to	  my	  topic	  because	  I	  hope	  to	  determine	  the	  effects	  the	  congestion	  tax	  would	  have	  on	  drivers	  in	  different	  income	  brackets.	  	  	  The	  New	  York	  City	  congestion	  tax	  is	  based	  on	  the	  London	  tax	  in	  many	  ways.	  Georgia	  Santos	  has	  written	  numerous	  papers	  on	  the	  effects	  the	  congestion	  tax	  has	  had	  on	  London	  drivers,	  so	  I	  have	  looked	  to	  her	  work	  for	  guidance.	  The	  most	  interesting	  piece	  of	  data	  for	  my	  thesis	  was	  her	  calculations	  for	  elasticities.	  She	  has	  computed	  different	  elasticities	  in	  two	  separate	  papers.	  In	  2004	  she	  computed	  the	  elasticity	  for	  the	  generalized	  cost	  of	  driving	  (GC)	  as	  follows	  (Santos	  2004)	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GC Excluding Fixed 
Costs 
Occupancy rate 1.35 1.35 
Average car trip (km) 11.7 11.7 
Number of trips per day 2 2 
VTTS per person (pence/min) 8.6 8.6 
 Time per trip (min) 47 47 
Time savings per trip (min)  6 6 
Vehicle operating costs (pence/km)  47.5 12.3 
GC per day (£) 22.07 13.82 
Toll (£) 5 5 
Time benefits (£) 1.4 1.4 
Reliability benefits 0.35 0.35 
Change in GC (£) -3.25 -3.25 
Change in GC (%) -14.7 -23.5 
Change in Demand (%) 31 31 
Elasticity  -2.1 -1.3 
SOURCE: Santos 2004, Pg. 175 
	  In	  2006,	  she	  updated	  her	  findings	  (Santos	  Fraser	  2006).
	  Since	  the	  elasticities	  come	  from	  different	  calculations,	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  know	  which	  one	  is	  correct	  or	  if	  the	  overall	  level	  would	  be	  equal	  if	  the	  second	  elasticities	  were	  averaged	  together.	  	  	   Another	  piece	  that	  is	  useful	  is	  the	  change	  in	  average	  speed	  in	  the	  charge	  zone.	  This	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graph	  of	  the	  average	  speed	  in	  the	  charge	  zone	  shows	  that	  initially,	  the	  average	  speed	  increased	  before	  steadily	  receding	  to	  its	  pre-­‐charge	  level	  (Santos,	  2004).	  
	   	  This	  means	  that	  some	  of	  the	  benefits	  to	  drivers	  from	  a	  congestion	  charge	  are	  lost	  over	  time,	  implying	  that	  the	  charge	  needs	  to	  be	  updated	  periodically	  to	  keep	  speed	  constant	  over	  time.	  	  
Model:	  
1.	  Elasticity	  To	  understand	  what	  the	  effects	  of	  an	  $8	  dollar	  congestion	  charge	  in	  New	  York	  City	  would	  be	  on	  drivers	  I	  first	  needed	  to	  calculate	  an	  elasticity	  for	  toll	  prices.	  To	  compute	  an	  elasticity	  of	  demand	  for	  driving	  in	  New	  York	  City	  I	  needed	  a	  data	  set	  that	  would	  show	  the	  effects	  of	  toll	  changes	  on	  driving	  volume	  so	  I	  could	  run	  regressions.	  Using	  the	  Annual	  Bridge	  and	  Tunnel	  report	  for	  2011	  and	  Manhattan’s	  Central	  Business	  District	  (CBD)	  report	  from	  the	  New	  York	  Metropolitan	  Transit	  Council	  (NYMTC),	  I	  was	  able	  to	  obtain	  the	  total	  volume	  of	  traffic	  over	  each	  bridge	  and	  tunnel	  within	  New	  York	  City	  from	  1950	  to	  2010.	  I	  then	  found	  the	  historic	  toll	  prices	  for	  each	  bridge	  and	  tunnel	  for	  this	  time	  frame	  using	  the	  Triborough	  Bridge	  and	  Tunnel	  Authority	  Investor	  Solutions	  Report	  (TBTA)	  and	  the	  Metropolitan	  Transportation	  Authority	  (MTA)	  website.	  This	  is	  the	  essential	  portion	  of	  the	  data,	  but	  I	  
	   	   	  	   12	  
needed	  other	  independent	  variables	  for	  my	  model	  to	  find	  the	  independent	  effect	  of	  toll	  prices	  on	  traffic	  volumes.	  Subway	  ridership,	  bus	  ridership	  and	  railroad	  ridership	  are	  also	  important	  variables	  because	  these	  are	  the	  main	  alternatives	  to	  driving	  and	  thus	  should	  be	  negatively	  correlated	  with	  traffic	  volumes.	  These	  data	  were	  also	  located	  in	  the	  NYMTC	  CBD	  report	  (Appendix	  5,	  NYTMC	  2011).	  	  	  It	  is	  also	  important	  to	  have	  transit	  prices	  and	  gas	  prices	  because	  they	  will	  affect	  both	  public	  transportation	  and	  roadway	  ridership.	  The	  last	  two	  data	  sets	  needed	  are	  the	  population	  for	  each	  borough	  and	  the	  median	  household	  income	  within	  each	  borough	  from	  1950	  to	  2010.	  I	  obtained	  these	  figures	  on	  a	  ten-­‐year	  basis	  from	  the	  U.S.	  census	  and	  then	  determined	  each	  year’s	  value	  by	  finding	  the	  growth	  rate	  from	  decade	  to	  decade	  and	  then	  using	  the	  overall	  decade	  growth	  rate	  to	  compute	  the	  population	  and	  income	  for	  each	  year	  within	  a	  decade.	  All	  dollar	  figures	  such	  as	  tolls,	  gas	  prices,	  and	  incomes	  are	  in	  2010	  dollars.	  	  	   These	  data	  were	  used	  to	  run	  regressions	  on	  bridges	  and	  tunnels	  within	  New	  York	  City	  to	  find	  their	  toll	  price	  elasticity.	  I	  decided	  to	  run	  regressions	  on	  15	  bridges	  and	  tunnels.	  There	  are	  13	  major	  crossings	  (George	  Washington	  Bridge,	  Lincoln	  Tunnel,	  Holland	  Tunnel,	  Battery	  Park	  Tunnel,	  Manhattan	  Bridge,	  Brooklyn	  Bridge,	  Williamsburg	  Bridge,	  Midtown	  Tunnel,	  Queensboro	  Bridge,	  RFK	  Bridge,	  Henry	  Hudson	  Bridge,	  Willis	  Ave	  Bridge,	  and	  Third	  Ave	  Bridge)	  into	  Manhattan.	  I	  left	  out	  8	  Harlem	  River	  bridges	  because	  they	  are	  not	  near	  any	  other	  tolled	  roadways	  and	  there	  are	  two	  other	  bridges	  between	  them	  and	  a	  tolled	  roadway	  so	  they	  are	  not	  affected	  by	  toll	  increases	  and	  thus	  would	  not	  be	  beneficial	  to	  my	  regressions.	  I	  then	  added	  two	  bridges	  within	  the	  city	  to	  the	  model,	  the	  Throgs	  Neck	  and	  the	  Bronx-­‐Whitestone	  Express,	  because	  they	  are	  similar	  to	  a	  Manhattan	  crossing	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  are	  high	  volume	  bridges	  whose	  only	  viable	  substitute	  is	  public	  transportation.	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They	  are	  also	  included	  in	  the	  Investor	  Solutions	  report	  so	  I	  can	  compare	  my	  elasticity	  for	  these	  bridges	  to	  the	  reports.	  I	  will	  average	  these	  15	  elasticities	  to	  find	  a	  general	  elasticity	  factor	  for	  New	  York	  City	  drivers	  for	  toll	  increases.	  Averaging	  the	  15	  elasticities	  with	  equal	  weight	  appears	  to	  be	  the	  best	  way	  to	  compute	  the	  elasticity	  because	  each	  bridge	  or	  tunnel	  should	  have	  a	  different	  elasticity	  depending	  on	  external	  factors.	  Therefore,	  averaging	  them	  all	  should	  capture	  these	  factors	  thus	  making	  the	  elasticity	  more	  comprehensive	  and	  closer	  to	  the	  true	  elasticity.	  	  	   	  For	  the	  regressions,	  the	  most	  important	  value	  is	  the	  tolls’	  impact	  on	  traffic.	  The	  goal	  is	  to	  make	  this	  variable	  either	  negative	  or	  positive	  depending	  on	  whether	  the	  bridge	  has	  a	  toll	  or	  not.	  For	  a	  tolled	  bridge,	  the	  toll	  variable	  should	  be	  negative	  indicating	  that	  as	  the	  toll	  increases	  the	  number	  of	  vehicles	  on	  the	  bridge	  decreases.	  For	  untolled	  bridges	  the	  expected	  sign	  for	  the	  toll	  variable	  is	  positive	  because	  as	  the	  tolled	  bridge	  becomes	  more	  expensive	  it	  gives	  people	  a	  larger	  incentive	  to	  travel	  over	  the	  free	  bridges.	  The	  variables	  transit	  price	  and	  gas	  price	  should	  both	  be	  negative	  while	  the	  population	  and	  income	  variables	  should	  be	  positive.	  The	  other	  independent	  variable	  in	  the	  model	  will	  be	  bridge	  or	  tunnel	  traffic	  for	  nearby	  facilities.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  add	  other	  roadways	  near	  the	  bridge	  because	  these	  are	  substitutes	  and	  thus	  fluctuations	  in	  their	  traffic	  volumes	  should	  impact	  the	  tolled	  facility.	  Thus	  each	  regression	  will	  all	  have	  the	  same	  main	  regressor	  components	  but	  will	  differ	  slightly	  depending	  on	  the	  location	  of	  the	  bridge	  or	  tunnel	  in	  the	  regression.	  
2.	  Charge’s	  effect	  on	  different	  Income	  groups	   	  The	  average	  elasticity	  I	  computed	  is	  then	  applied	  to	  the	  NYMYC	  Hub	  data	  set,	  which	  is	  a	  snapshot	  of	  the	  average	  traffic	  that	  comes	  into	  Manhattan’s	  “Hub,”	  the	  area	  below	  60th	  street	  (Table	  5).	  It	  has	  the	  volume	  of	  traffic	  over	  the	  bridges,	  tunnels	  and	  the	  public	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Results:	  	  	  
Elasticity:	  	  To	  compute	  the	  toll	  elasticity	  of	  New	  York	  City	  drivers	  driving	  into	  Manhattan,	  I	  ran	  regressions	  on	  13	  of	  the	  bridges	  and	  tunnels	  previous	  mentioned	  and	  then	  took	  the	  average	  of	  the	  elasticities	  (Appendix	  8).	  I	  dropped	  the	  George	  Washington	  and	  the	  Willis	  Ave	  Bridge.	  The	  p-­‐value	  for	  the	  toll	  value	  for	  the	  George	  Washington	  Bridge’s	  was	  not	  statistically	  significant	  at	  any	  level	  (Appendix	  6).	  The	  Willis	  Ave	  toll	  value	  was	  negative	  which	  does	  not	  make	  sense	  because	  it	  is	  untolled	  and	  next	  to	  a	  tolled	  bridge	  (Appendix	  7).	  I	  also	  ran	  regressions	  on	  a	  few	  of	  the	  Harlem	  River	  bridges	  that	  I	  decided	  not	  to	  include	  in	  my	  model	  to	  test	  my	  hypothesis	  about	  them	  being	  statistically	  insignificant	  because	  of	  their	  distance	  from	  any	  tolled	  facilities.	  	  My	  hypothesis	  was	  correct	  so	  I	  kept	  them	  out	  of	  my	  model.	  	  	   	  After	  running	  the	  regressions	  I	  had	  to	  determine	  the	  best	  way	  to	  compute	  the	  average	  of	  the	  toll	  elasticities.	  The	  problem	  with	  the	  elasticities	  was	  that	  some	  of	  them	  were	  positive	  and	  some	  were	  negative,	  depending	  on	  if	  the	  bridge	  or	  tunnel	  was	  tolled.	  Therefore,	  I	  could	  not	  average	  the	  numbers	  because	  it	  would	  not	  make	  sense	  to	  have	  positive	  elasticities	  with	  a	  congestion	  charge.	  I	  decided	  to	  run	  two	  averages,	  one	  of	  just	  the	  tolled	  bridges	  and	  tunnels	  and	  the	  other	  with	  all	  the	  faculties.	  However,	  for	  the	  second	  average,	  rather	  than	  have	  positive	  and	  negative	  numbers,	  I	  decided	  it	  would	  make	  more	  sense	  to	  take	  absolute	  value	  of	  all	  the	  numbers,	  compute	  the	  average,	  then	  multiply	  the	  number	  by	  -­‐1.	  This	  makes	  the	  most	  sense	  because	  none	  of	  the	  bridges	  or	  tunnels	  toll	  elasticities	  would	  be	  positive	  with	  a	  congestion	  charge	  in	  place.	  In	  addition,	  the	  absolute	  values	  of	  both	  the	  positive	  elasticities	  for	  the	  untolled	  bridges	  and	  the	  negative	  elasticities	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for	  the	  tolled	  bridges	  were	  very	  similar.	  This	  implies	  that	  a	  1%	  percent	  increase	  in	  a	  toll	  would	  make	  the	  traffic	  on	  a	  tolled	  bridge	  decrease	  by	  the	  same	  percentage	  as	  the	  traffic	  on	  an	  untolled	  bridge	  would	  increase.	  Thus,	  I	  wanted	  to	  compare	  the	  two	  averages	  and	  take	  the	  one	  that	  made	  the	  most	  logical	  sense.	  The	  average	  elasticity	  of	  all	  of	  the	  tolled	  bridges	  was	  -­‐.136.	  The	  average	  elasticity	  for	  the	  untolled	  bridges	  and	  tolled	  bridges	  after	  taking	  the	  absolute	  value	  of	  the	  negative	  tolled	  bridge	  was	  .132.	  Multiplying	  it	  by	  -­‐1	  to	  make	  it	  negative,	  as	  it	  should	  be,	  it	  came	  to	  -­‐.132.	  	  The	  values	  were	  similar,	  as	  I	  expected.	  I	  thus	  decided	  to	  use	  the	  second	  model,	  so	  my	  elasticity	  for	  driving	  into	  New	  York	  City	  is	  -­‐.132.	  This	  means	  that	  for	  a	  bridge	  or	  tunnel,	  every	  1%	  increase	  in	  the	  toll	  price,	  traffic	  volumes	  will	  decrease	  by	  .132%.	  	  	   An	  important	  thing	  to	  note	  about	  some	  of	  the	  toll	  elasticities	  used	  in	  the	  average	  is	  that	  they	  had	  t-­‐scores	  that	  were	  low,	  below	  1.8.	  	  A	  t-­‐score	  this	  low	  can	  make	  the	  results	  questionable	  because	  the	  p-­‐values	  are	  close	  to	  being	  statistically	  insignificant	  at	  a	  95%	  confidence	  interval.	  There	  were	  4	  bridges	  and	  tunnels	  that	  had	  t-­‐scores	  below	  1.8	  and	  a	  two	  others	  that	  had	  t-­‐scores	  below	  2	  (Appendix	  8).	  This	  can	  be	  an	  issue	  in	  some	  models	  but	  I	  do	  not	  believe	  this	  is	  a	  problem	  in	  my	  model	  because	  all	  of	  the	  tolls	  have	  the	  correct	  sign.	  	  	  	   To	  compare	  my	  elasticities	  with	  the	  elasticities	  found	  in	  the	  Triborough	  Bridge	  and	  Tunnel	  Authority	  Investor	  Solutions	  Report	  I	  decided	  to	  run	  regressions	  on	  the	  Crossbay	  Bridge	  and	  the	  Marine	  Parkway	  Bridge	  (Appendix	  9).	  By	  doing	  this	  I	  ran	  regressions	  on	  8	  of	  the	  9	  bridges	  and	  tunnels	  in	  the	  report.	  	  The	  TBTA	  historic	  elasticities	  and	  my	  elasticities	  had	  the	  same	  signs	  but	  the	  results	  suggest	  that	  the	  facilities	  elasticities	  may	  be	  more	  inelastic	  then	  the	  TBTA	  Report	  findings	  (Table	  3).	  These	  difference	  could	  be	  caused	  by	  different	  data	  sets	  or	  different	  factors	  included	  in	  the	  regressions.	  However,	  these	  results	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do	  add	  validity	  to	  the	  TBTA	  Report	  because	  the	  signs	  are	  similar	  and	  both	  sets	  of	  elasticities	  are	  very	  inelastic.	  	  






Throgs Neck Bridge -0.109 -0.129 
Bronx-Whitestone 
Bridge -0.109 -0.123 
RFK Bridge -0.164 -0.104 
Queens Midtown 
Tunnel -0.192 -0.044 
Hugh L. Carey 
Tunnel -0.358 -0.207 
Henry Hudson 
Bridge -0.282 -0.162 
Marine Parkway 
Bridge -0.101 -0.041 
Cross Bay Bridge -0.137 -0.041 
Source: Santec/TBTA Pg. 33   
 
Congestion	  Charge	  Effects:	  After	  computing	  the	  elasticity,	  I	  applied	  it	  to	  the	  NYMTC	  CDB	  snapshot	  of	  the	  average	  traffic	  flowing	  into	  charge	  zone	  on	  a	  business	  day	  from	  6	  a.m.	  to	  6	  p.m.	  (Table	  5).	  This	  data	  set	  breaks	  down	  the	  traffic	  volume	  for	  every	  entryway	  into	  the	  CBD.	  I	  first	  determined	  which	  entry	  points	  the	  congestion	  charge	  would	  not	  affect	  because	  of	  the	  toll-­‐offset	  exemption.	  The	  drivers	  on	  the	  Lincoln	  Tunnel,	  Holland	  Tunnel,	  Brooklyn	  Battery	  Tunnel,	  and	  the	  Midtown	  Tunnel	  would	  be	  exempt	  from	  the	  charge	  and	  thus	  these	  traffic	  volumes	  will	  stay	  the	  same	  in	  the	  model.	  I	  also	  determined	  that	  traffic	  volumes	  on	  two	  roadways,	  the	  FDR	  Drive	  and	  the	  West	  Side	  Highway,	  would	  only	  be	  slightly	  affected	  by	  the	  congestion	  charge	  because	  the	  traffic	  from	  tolled	  roadways	  enters	  the	  CBD	  on	  these	  roadways.	  The	  FDR	  Drive	  connects	  the	  Triborough	  Bridge	  to	  the	  CBD	  and	  the	  West	  Side	  Highway	  connects	  the	  George	  Washington	  Bridge	  to	  the	  CBD.	  To	  determine	  how	  many	  vehicles	  would	  be	  exempt	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from	  the	  charge	  on	  these	  roadways	  because	  of	  the	  toll-­‐offset	  I	  first	  calculated	  the	  traffic	  volumes	  for	  these	  bridges	  from	  6	  a.m.	  to	  6p.m.	  I	  then	  studied	  the	  routes	  around	  the	  area	  and	  determined	  the	  percentage	  of	  traffic	  from	  the	  George	  Washington	  and	  Triborough	  Bridges	  that	  drove	  into	  the	  CBD	  on	  the	  two	  roadways.	  For	  the	  George	  Washington	  Bridge	  I	  determined	  only	  20%	  of	  traffic,	  30,576	  cars,	  went	  into	  the	  CBD	  through	  the	  West	  Side	  Highway.	  	  The	  Triborough	  Bridge	  had	  a	  higher	  percentage,	  50%	  or	  45,000	  cars	  going	  into	  the	  CBD	  after	  crossing	  the	  bridge.	  I	  had	  to	  remove	  these	  figures	  from	  each	  route	  before	  I	  applied	  the	  elasticities	  to	  them	  because	  they	  would	  not	  be	  affected	  by	  the	  congestion	  charge.	  I	  then	  added	  the	  numbers	  back	  into	  the	  newly	  adjusted	  traffic	  volumes	  to	  compute	  the	  total	  volumes	  of	  traffic	  after	  accounting	  for	  the	  congestion	  charge.	  	   The	  elasticity	  I	  computed	  is	  a	  percentage	  change	  in	  traffic	  volumes	  for	  a	  percentage	  change	  in	  toll	  price	  or	  driving	  price.	  This	  applies	  well	  to	  a	  change	  in	  a	  toll	  from	  $4	  dollars	  to	  $5	  dollars,	  but	  the	  congestion	  charge	  does	  not	  work	  this	  way.	  The	  charge	  goes	  from	  $0	  dollars	  to	  $8	  dollars,	  which	  means	  computing	  a	  percentage	  change	  in	  price	  is	  not	  possible.	  I	  therefore	  used	  three	  different	  models	  to	  determine	  the	  possible	  effects	  the	  congestion	  charge	  would	  have	  on	  traffic	  volumes.	  	  	   The	  first	  model	  extrapolates	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  London	  congestion	  charge	  on	  traffic	  volumes	  for	  the	  first	  year	  it	  was	  implemented	  and	  applies	  it	  to	  NYC.	  The	  traffic	  volume	  changes	  in	  London	  because	  of	  the	  congestion	  charge	  are	  reported	  in	  Table	  4:	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Table 4 
London Traffic Volume % change when charge 
enacted 
Vehicle type  2003 vs. 2002 
All vehicles -14% 
Four or more wheels  -18% 
Potentially chargeable  -27% 
Cars and minicabs -33% 
Vans -11% 
Lorries and other  -11% 
Non chargeable 18% 
Licensed taxis 17% 
Buses and coaches 23% 
Powered two-wheelers  12% 
Pedal cycles 19% 
Source: TFL 2007 Pg. 21 	  I	  used	  the	  percent	  for	  potentially	  chargeable	  vehicles,	  27%,	  as	  the	  change	  in	  traffic	  volumes	  on	  NYC	  roadways.	  This	  results	  in	  a	  19.55%	  total	  decrease	  in	  traffic	  for	  the	  CBD	  (Table	  5).	  	  	   The	  remaining	  models	  incorporate	  the	  elasticity	  I	  computed.	  The	  second	  model	  uses	  the	  price	  of	  public	  transportation,	  $2.50,	  as	  the	  base	  price	  to	  compute	  the	  percent	  change	  because	  it	  is	  the	  substitute	  cost	  to	  driving	  into	  the	  CBD.	  The	  percent	  change	  from	  $2.50	  to	  $8	  dollars	  is	  220%.	  With	  an	  elasticity	  of	  -­‐.132,	  the	  traffic	  volumes	  should	  decrease	  by	  29.04%.	  This	  is	  2.04	  percentage	  points	  more	  then	  the	  London	  result,	  which	  makes	  the	  decision	  to	  choose	  public	  transportation	  price	  as	  a	  logical	  starting	  price.	  This	  model	  resulted	  in	  a	  21.5%	  change	  in	  traffic	  volumes	  within	  the	  CBD	  (Table	  5).	  	  	  	   The	  last	  model	  uses	  the	  entire	  cost	  to	  drive	  into	  the	  CBD	  on	  a	  typical	  business	  day,	  using	  the	  free	  bridges	  as	  the	  base	  price.	  The	  two	  main	  costs	  for	  driving	  into	  the	  CBD	  are	  the	  price	  of	  parking	  within	  the	  CBD	  and	  the	  cost	  of	  gas.	  The	  average	  price	  of	  parking	  per	  day	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within	  the	  CBD	  comes	  to	  $15	  dollars	  if	  one	  has	  a	  monthly	  contract	  with	  a	  parking	  garage	  in	  the	  area	  (Skillings,	  2014)	  The	  cost	  of	  gas	  per	  day	  that	  I	  use	  is	  $8	  dollars	  on	  average	  because	  of	  the	  different	  distances	  drivers	  have	  to	  travel	  and	  the	  stop	  and	  go	  traffic,	  which	  burns	  more	  fuel.	  In	  this	  model	  drivers	  now	  pay	  on	  average	  $23	  a	  day	  to	  drive	  into	  the	  city	  if	  they	  use	  the	  free	  entryways.	  Adding	  the	  congestion	  charge	  of	  $8	  dollars	  makes	  the	  average	  cost	  of	  driving	  into	  the	  CBD	  $31.	  This	  is	  a	  35%	  increase	  in	  price,	  which	  should	  decrease	  traffic	  volumes	  5%	  with	  an	  elasticity	  of	  -­‐.132.	  After	  applying	  this	  to	  the	  CBD	  traffic	  volumes,	  traffic	  would	  decrease	  by	  3.62%	  in	  the	  CBD	  (Table	  5).	  	   These	  three	  models	  give	  different	  traffic	  volume	  changes	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  congestion	  charge.	  The	  first	  two	  models	  give	  very	  similar	  changes	  in	  traffic	  volumes	  in	  response	  to	  the	  congestion	  charge.	  The	  third	  model	  predicted	  only	  a	  4%	  decrease	  in	  total	  traffic	  volume	  in	  the	  CBD.	  I	  will	  use	  the	  results	  of	  the	  second	  model,	  a	  21.5%	  decrease	  in	  traffic	  volumes,	  as	  the	  predicted	  outcome	  of	  the	  congestion	  charge.	  I	  made	  this	  choice	  because	  I	  did	  not	  want	  to	  copy	  the	  exact	  results	  of	  the	  London	  congestion	  charge	  because	  New	  York	  City	  and	  London	  are	  different.	  However,	  I	  believe	  the	  traffic	  volume	  change	  in	  NYC	  in	  response	  to	  the	  congestion	  charge	  will	  be	  similar	  to	  London’s.	  Therefore,	  the	  second	  model	  fits	  better	  than	  the	  third	  model.	  The	  majority	  of	  this	  decrease	  in	  traffic	  volumes	  will	  be	  from	  the	  Bronx,	  Queens,	  and	  Brooklyn.	  I	  can	  examine	  the	  demographics	  of	  these	  areas	  to	  estimate	  whether	  the	  congestion	  charge	  will	  be	  a	  regressive	  tax.	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Table 5: Total Traffic into HUB from 6 a.m. 
















% Change in roadways affected by tolls   27.00% 29.04% 5.00% 
EAST OF CENTRAL PARK         
FDR DRIVE 151,111 122,461 119,596 145,805 
YORK AVENUE 35,819 26,148 25,181 34,028 
SECOND AND FIRST AVENUES 72,127 52,653 50,705 68,521 
QUEENSBORO BRIDGE RAMP 35,409 25,849 24,893 33,639 
LEXINGTON AND THIRD AVENUES 56,261 41,071 39,551 53,448 
PARK AVENUE 40,721 29,726 28,627 38,685 
FIFTH AND MADISON AVENUES 52,204 38,109 36,699 49,594 
SUBTOTAL 443,652 336,016 325,252 423,719 
          
CENTRAL PARK DRIVES 6,946 5,071 4,883 6,599 
          
WEST OF CENTRAL PARK         
CENTRAL PARK WEST 14,517 10,597 10,205 13,791 
BROADWAY 31,885 23,276 22,415 30,291 
COLUMBUS AND AMSTERDAM AVES 47,261 34,501 33,224 44,898 
WEST END AVENUE 25,009 18,257 17,581 23,759 
WEST SIDE HIGHWAY 110,341 88,788 86,633 106,350 
SUBTOTAL 229,013 175,419 170,060 219,088 
SECTOR TOTAL 679,611 516,506 500,195 649,406 
BROOKLYN SECTOR         
WILLIAMSBURG BRIDGE 112,696  82,268 79,225 107,061 
MANHATTAN BRIDGE 89,087  65,034 62,628 84,633 
BROOKLYN BRIDGE 100,288  73,210 70,502 95,274 
BROOKLYN BATTERY TUNNEL 53,067  53,067 53,067 53,067 
SECTOR TOTAL 355,138  273,579 265,423 340,034 
QUEENS SECTOR         
QUEENS MIDTOWN TUNNEL 90,992 90,992 90,992 90,992 
QUEENSBORO BRIDGE 177,455 129,542 124,751 168,582 
SECTOR TOTAL 268,447 220,534 215,743 259,574 
NEW JERSEY SECTOR         
HOLLAND TUNNEL 91,957 91,957 91,957 91,957 
LINCOLN TUNNEL 101,235 101,235 101,235 101,235 
SECTOR TOTAL 193,192 193,192 193,192 193,192 
TOTAL, ALL FACILITIES 1,496,388 1,203,810 1,174,553 1,442,207 
% Decrease in total traffic   19.55% 21.50% 3.62% 
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Progressive	  or	  Regressive:	  	  Although	  I	  knew	  drivers	  from	  the	  Bronx,	  Queens,	  and	  Brooklyn	  would	  be	  the	  portion	  of	  New	  York	  City	  commuters	  most	  adversely	  affected	  by	  the	  congestion	  charge,	  I	  had	  to	  ensure	  this	  through	  finding	  the	  elasticity	  and	  modeling	  the	  impact	  on	  traffic	  volumes.	  Now	  that	  I	  have	  determined	  the	  impacts	  on	  traffic	  volumes,	  I	  can	  analyze	  if	  the	  congestion	  charge	  is	  a	  regressive	  tax.	  	  	   To	  do	  this	  I	  used	  the	  paper	  by	  Peters	  and	  Kramer,	  which	  contains	  the	  Gini	  coefficients	  and	  median	  household	  income	  for	  bridge	  and	  tunnel	  users	  (Appendix	  4).	  I	  also	  used	  the	  Interim	  Report	  by	  Assemblyman	  Brodsky,	  which	  contains	  the	  average	  income	  for	  households	  with	  and	  without	  cars	  for	  the	  different	  boroughs	  and	  the	  percent	  of	  traffic	  volume	  each	  borough	  makes	  up	  within	  the	  CBD	  (Appendix	  2).	  	  	   Examining	  the	  “Gini	  Coefficients	  for	  All	  Bridges	  and	  Public	  Transit”	  table	  (Appendix	  4)	  it	  shows	  the	  “free”	  bridge	  users	  have	  a	  lower	  median	  household	  income	  and	  lower	  Gini	  coefficient	  than	  the	  tolled	  facilities	  users.	  The	  median	  household	  income	  for	  the	  users	  of	  the	  13	  facilities	  I	  used	  to	  compute	  the	  elasticity	  is	  $84,744.	  The	  NYC	  residents	  who	  use	  the	  Harlem	  River	  bridges	  have	  a	  median	  household	  income	  of	  $63,000.	  The	  NYC	  residents	  who	  use	  free	  East	  River	  bridges	  have	  a	  median	  household	  income	  of	  $56,731.	  My	  model	  on	  traffic	  volume	  decreases	  in	  conjunction	  with	  this	  paper	  	  suggests	  that	  the	  congestion	  charge	  is	  concentrated	  on	  the	  lower	  income	  drivers.	  Although	  the	  median	  household	  income	  for	  NYC	  residents	  who	  drive	  over	  the	  Harlem	  and	  East	  River	  bridges	  is	  higher	  the	  median	  household	  income	  of	  the	  U.S.	  population,	  it	  is	  far	  below	  the	  average	  median	  household	  income	  for	  those	  who	  drive	  into	  the	  CBD.	  Therefore,	  this	  analysis	  suggests	  the	  congestion	  charge	  will	  be	  a	  regressive	  tax	  because	  it	  will	  have	  a	  larger	  impact	  on	  “lower”	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income	  drivers.	  	  	   The	  data	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Interim	  Report	  provide	  another	  way	  to	  determine	  if	  the	  	  	  	  	  congestion	  charge	  would	  be	  a	  regressive	  tax	  (Appendix	  2).	  I	  viewed	  these	  data	  three	  different	  ways.	  I	  only	  focused	  on	  households	  in	  Manhattan,	  Queens,	  the	  Bronx,	  and	  Brooklyn	  because	  they	  make	  up	  84%	  of	  the	  daily	  trips	  into	  the	  CBD.	  I	  first	  compared	  the	  income	  difference	  between	  households	  with	  cars	  and	  those	  without.	  This	  interpretation	  of	  the	  data	  suggests	  that	  the	  congestion	  charge	  will	  not	  be	  regressive	  because	  household	  with	  cars	  have	  incomes	  that	  are	  on	  average	  double	  that	  of	  households	  without	  cars.	  Therefore,	  the	  congestion	  charge	  would	  not	  be	  a	  regressive	  tax	  but	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  progressive	  tax.	  	  	   The	  second	  way	  I	  used	  the	  data	  was	  to	  compare	  the	  household	  income	  between	  boroughs	  for	  those	  with	  cars.	  Viewing	  the	  data	  this	  way	  makes	  it	  harder	  to	  determine	  if	  the	  charge	  will	  be	  progressive	  or	  regressive.	  There	  is	  a	  clear	  disparity	  in	  household	  income	  between	  the	  boroughs,	  with	  the	  intra-­‐zone	  (CBD)	  income	  being	  almost	  3	  times	  that	  of	  Queens,	  the	  Bronx,	  and	  Brooklyn.	  This	  implies	  the	  zones	  with	  lower	  incomes	  will	  be	  more	  impacted	  by	  the	  charge.	  This	  points	  to	  the	  charge	  being	  a	  regressive	  tax.	  However,	  the	  intra-­‐zone	  accounts	  for	  almost	  50%	  of	  the	  trips,	  therefore	  they	  will	  be	  the	  group	  paying	  the	  largest	  percent	  of	  the	  charge.	  The	  intra-­‐zone	  households	  are	  on	  average	  the	  wealthiest	  drivers	  so	  the	  charge	  could	  be	  considered	  progressive.	  	   	  The	  third	  way	  I	  viewed	  the	  data	  makes	  it	  seem	  as	  though	  the	  congestion	  charge	  will	  be	  more	  a	  regressive	  tax.	  The	  last	  column	  of	  the	  table	  shows	  the	  percentage	  of	  daily	  fee	  paid,	  which	  is	  the	  percentage	  of	  the	  daily	  revenues	  from	  the	  fees	  that	  each	  borough	  pays.	  Queens,	  the	  Bronx,	  and	  Brooklyn	  account	  for	  only	  23%	  of	  trips	  into	  the	  charge	  zone	  but	  would	  pay	  almost	  40%	  of	  the	  fee	  revenues.	  This	  demonstrates	  that	  the	  charge	  is	  heavily	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concentrated	  on	  the	  traffic	  from	  these	  three	  boroughs.	  These	  three	  boroughs	  have	  the	  lowest	  average	  household	  income	  of	  any	  of	  the	  surrounding	  areas.	  Therefore,	  it	  appears	  that	  the	  congestion	  charge	  would	  be	  a	  regressive	  tax.	  The	  most	  model	  appears	  to	  be	  the	  correct	  interpretation	  of	  the	  congestion	  charges	  affect	  on	  drivers.	  
Conclusion:	  	  This	  paper	  considers	  whether	  a	  congestion	  charge	  of	  $8	  dollars	  would	  be	  a	  progressive	  or	  regressive	  tax	  to	  New	  York	  City	  drivers.	  After	  computing	  an	  elasticity	  by	  averaging	  the	  elasticities	  of	  13	  New	  York	  City	  bridges	  and	  tunnels	  I	  was	  able	  to	  conclusively	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  areas	  most	  adversely	  affected	  by	  the	  congestion	  charge	  would	  be	  Queens,	  Brooklyn,	  and	  the	  Bronx.	  I	  then	  used	  the	  data	  sets	  in	  the	  paper	  by	  Peter	  and	  Kramer	  and	  the	  Interim	  Report	  by	  Assemblyman	  Broody	  to	  try	  to	  determine	  whether	  the	  congestion	  charge	  would	  be	  a	  progressive	  or	  regressive	  tax.	  After	  my	  analysis	  of	  the	  data	  and	  information	  I	  believe	  this	  charge	  will	  be	  a	  regressive	  tax.	  The	  inclusion	  of	  the	  toll-­‐offset	  program	  makes	  it	  a	  regressive	  tax	  in	  my	  opinion.	  By	  including	  the	  offset,	  the	  congestion	  charge	  mainly	  becomes	  a	  toll	  for	  users	  of	  the	  free	  bridges	  and	  drivers	  who	  live	  within	  the	  congestion-­‐zone.	  However,	  those	  who	  live	  within	  the	  zone	  are	  the	  wealthiest	  and	  pay	  a	  reduced	  fee	  so	  the	  impact	  on	  them	  is	  less	  severe.	  I	  therefore	  agree	  with	  the	  Assemblyman’s	  interpretation	  of	  the	  congestion	  charge	  as	  being	  regressive.	  However,	  I	  still	  believe	  the	  charge	  is	  a	  good	  idea	  and	  can	  have	  benefits	  for	  New	  York	  City	  residents	  if	  implemented	  properly.	  The	  only	  way	  the	  congestion	  charge	  will	  not	  be	  a	  regressive	  tax	  is	  if	  the	  Harlem	  River	  and	  East	  River	  bridges	  are	  kept	  toll	  free.	  This	  is	  not	  likely	  to	  happen	  and	  should	  not	  happen	  because	  these	  bridges	  cause	  major	  traffic	  congestion	  in	  the	  CBD.	  However,	  the	  revenues	  from	  these	  bridges	  should	  be	  used	  to	  increase	  and	  improve	  the	  public	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transportation	  infrastructure	  for	  Queens,	  Brooklyn,	  and	  the	  Bronx.	  Figure	  2	  from	  Peter	  and	  Kramer	  (Pg.	  127)	  displays	  the	  percentage	  of	  the	  population	  in	  each	  borough	  that	  lives	  within	  ½	  mile	  of	  a	  subway	  station.	  This	  demonstrates	  that	  there	  is	  still	  a	  lot	  that	  can	  be	  done	  from	  an	  infrastructure	  standpoint	  to	  make	  taking	  public	  transportation	  into	  the	  CBD	  more	  attractive.	  Improving	  the	  public	  transportation	  lines	  would	  offset	  the	  regressive	  nature	  of	  the	  congestion	  charge	  and	  could	  actually	  benefit	  lower	  income	  workers	  more	  in	  the	  long	  run.	  Therefore,	  a	  congestion	  charge	  would	  not	  be	  as	  regressive	  if	  the	  revenues	  were	  used	  solely	  to	  upgrade	  and	  build	  new	  public	  transportation	  lines.	  Therefore	  my	  recommendation	  is	  for	  a	  congestion	  charge	  that	  has	  no	  toll-­‐offsets	  and	  that	  the	  revenues	  from	  the	  charge	  are	  used	  to	  improve	  public	  transportation.	  	  
Figure	  2	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Appendix	  Appendix	  1:	  Map	  of	  the	  Charge	  Zone	  and	  Bridges	  and	  Tunnels	  in	  the	  Area	  (Schaller	  2010)
	  Appendix	  2:	  Appendix	  from	  Brodsky	  report:	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Appendix	  3:	  Table	  of	  untolled	  trips	  over	  East	  River	  and	  Harlem	  River	  bridges	  and	  demographics	  of	  the	  commuters	  (IBO,	  Pg.	  4,	  2003).	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Appendix	  4:	  	  Table	  of	  commuters	  into	  NYC	  and	  their	  Median	  Income	  and	  Gini	  coefficient.	  The	  ranks	  “Columns	  3	  and	  5	  of	  Table	  3	  rank	  the	  various	  systems	  that	  one	  can	  use	  to	  reach	  Manhattan	  based	  on	  their	  potential	  strength	  to	  reduce	  the	  regressivity	  of	  the	  proposal.	  The	  lower	  the	  number	  ranking,	  the	  greater	  the	  potential	  a	  particular	  route	  has	  to	  reduce	  the	  regressive	  nature	  of	  the	  proposal.”(Peter	  and	  Kramer	  Pg.	  131-­‐132,	  2003)	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Appendix	  5:	  NYMTC	  CBD	  report	  of	  “PERSONS	  AND	  VEHICLES	  ENTERING	  THE	  HUB	  ON	  A	  FALL	  BUSINESS	  DAY,	  FOR	  SELECTED	  YEARS”	  (in	  thousands)	  (NYMTC,	  2011) 
	  Appendix	  6:	  George	  Washington	  Bridge	  Regression	  
	  Appendix	  7:	  Willis	  Ave	  Bridge	  Regression	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Appendix	  8:	  Regression	  results	  of	  13	  bridges	  used	  in	  model.	  Variable	  List:	  Real	  MTAB	  Toll	  Price,	  Real	  PANJNY	  Toll	  Price,	  Real	  Gas	  Price,	  Real	  Transit	  Price,	  Real	  Kings	  (Brooklyn)	  Income,	  Real	  Queens	  Income,	  Real	  Bronx	  Income,	  Bus	  Ridership,	  Subway	  Ridership,	  Railroad	  Ridership,	  Brooklyn	  Population,	  Queens	  Population,	  Bronx	  Population,	  Traffic	  Volumes	  on	  the	  George	  Washington	  Bridge,	  Lincoln	  Tunnel,	  Holland	  Tunnel,	  Battery	  Park	  Tunnel,	  Manhattan	  Bridge,	  Brooklyn	  Bridge,	  Williamsburg	  Bridge,	  Midtown	  Tunnel,	  Queensboro	  Bridge,	  RFK	  Bridge,	  Henry	  Hudson	  Bridge,	  Willis	  Ave	  Bridge,	  Third	  Ave	  Bridge,	  Throgs	  Neck	  Bridge,	  Bronx-­‐Whitestone	  Express	  Bridge,	  Cross	  Bay	  Bridge,	  and	  Marine	  Parkway	  Bridge.	  	  	  Untolled	  Bridges:	  Brooklyn	  Bridge	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Manhattan	  Bridge	  
	  
	  Williamsburg	  Bridge	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Queensborough	  Bridge	  
	  
	  	  3rd	  Ave	  Bridge	  
	  
	  	  	  
	   	   	  	   35	  
Tolled	  Facilities:	  Midtown	  Tunnel	  
	  Battery	  Tunnel	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Triborough	  Bridge	  
	  
	  Throgs	  Neck	  Bridge	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Bronx-­‐Whitestone	  Express	  Bridge	  
	  
	  Lincoln	  Tunnel	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Holland	  Tunnel	  
	  
	  	  Henry	  Hudson	  Bridge	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Appendix	  9:	  Regression	  results	  of	  Cross	  Bay	  and	  Marine	  Parkway	  bridges	  Marine	  Parkway	  Bridge	  
	  
	  Cross	  Bay	  Bridge	  
	  
	  
